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Abstract
For a long time scholars of industrial relations tended to associate notions of interna-
tionalization with the debate about the cross-border convergence of industrial relations 
systems. Convergence versus path dependence was thus a key controversy in industrial 
relations studies for decades. This debate was mirrored in multinational companies 
when their attempts to “export” industrial relations practices to foreign subsidiaries 
encountered host country influences that constrained such attempts. In recent years 
many scholars shown the need for a wider and more complex analysis of international-
ization processes that goes beyond the convergence/path dependence dichotomy. Build-
ing on this development, the paper presents a historical case study of the impact of 
cross-border subsidiary integration on industrial relations at Ford Germany and Ford 
UK between 1967 and 1985. I argue that convergence and path dependence need to 
be combined with a third “differential internationalization” approach that reflects the 
country-specific gradual change that emerges from subsidiary integration. The paper 
concludes by reflecting on the implications of the case study for contemporary interna-
tionalization debates.
Zusammenfassung
In der vergleichenden Forschung zu industriellen Beziehungen sind Internationalisie-
rungsprozesse lange vor allem im Hinblick auf eine mögliche Konvergenz nationaler 
Modelle diskutiert worden. Konvergenz versus Pfadabhängigkeit entwickelte sich zu 
einer der zentralen Debatten. In der Forschung über multinationale Firmen fand diese 
Debatte ihr Äquivalent in der Gegenüberstellung von „Exportversuchen“ durch Firmen-
zentralen und deren Beschränkung durch Regulierung im Empfängerland. In jüngster 
Zeit haben jedoch viele Autoren darauf hingewiesen, dass eine komplexere Analyse von 
Internationaliserungsprozessen notwendig ist, welche über die Dichotomie zwischen 
Konvergenz und Pfadabhängigkeit hinausgeht. Der Artikel schließt an diese Ansätze 
an und präsentiert eine historische Fallstudie über den Einfluss grenzüberschreiten-
der Integration von Tochtergesellschaften auf die industriellen Beziehungen bei Ford 
in Deutschland und Großbritannien zwischen 1967 und 1985. Ich argumentiere, dass 
„Konvergenz“ und „Pfadabhängigkeit“ mit einem dritten Ansatz verbunden werden 
sollten, den man als „differentielle Internationalisierung“ bezeichnen kann, da er jeweils 
landesspezifischen graduellen Wandlungsprozessen nachgeht, die aus der Integration 
von Tochtergesellschaften erwachsen. Im Schlussteil wird versucht, einige Implikationen 
der Fallstudie für die gegenwärtige Internationaliserungsdebatte herauszuarbeiten.
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1 Introduction
Among comparative industrial relations (IR) scholars,1 notions of internationalization 
were for a long time predominantly associated with the debate about the cross-border 
convergence of IR systems, which had been initiated by John Dunlop and Clark Kerr in 
the early postwar period (Dunlop 1958; Kerr 1960). Convergence theorists expected in-
ternational economic integration to be a key dynamic underlying the process towards a 
common pattern of “best practice,” while their opponents invoked the path-dependent 
character of national IR systems – shaped by different socio-political legacies (Crouch 
1993) and “varieties of capitalisms” (Hall/Soskice 2001) – to reject such hypotheses 
(Smith 1999). In the case of multinational companies (MNCs), this debate was mir-
rored in scholarly juxtapositions of MNC headquarter attempts to “export” IR practices 
to foreign subsidiaries with host country influences that constrained such attempts.2
In recent years, however, the usefulness of the dichotomy between convergence and 
path dependence has been questioned. On the one hand, there has been a growing ap-
preciation that both approaches are not mutually exclusive – throughout the post-1945 
period, IR systems have often shifted in similar ways across Western Europe while, at 
the same time, country-specific institutional arrangements have shown a remarkable 
degree of resilience (Smith 1999). In the words of Wolfgang Streeck (1998: 438): “[…] 
differences in national industrial relations systems can be properly understood only in 
the context of their interaction with general tendencies.”
On the other hand, recent research suggests that even a combination of convergence 
and path dependence approaches is unlikely to fully explain internationalization dy-
namics. It has been demonstrated that internationalization often affects countries in 
different ways, not only because of different, path-dependent receiving conditions, but 
also because the exposure to international dynamics varies and because such dynam-
ics are differently “appropriated” in individual countries (Schmidt 2007). In the case 
of multinational firms, recent work has likewise emphasized that internationalization 
processes cannot be exclusively understood as interactions between headquarter (HQ) 
convergence pressures and host country constraints, but points instead to the need for a 
more complex analysis of the relationship between HQ and subsidiary actors, and their 
embeddedness in the national and international environments (Morgan/Kristensen/
Whitley 2001; Ferner/Tempel 2006).
Building on these insights, the article presents a case study concerned with the impact 
of the cross-border integration of Ford’s European operations on industrial relations 
1 The term "industrial relations" is used here in its conventional meaning as the system of rela-
tionships between workers, trade unions, employers and the state that is concerned with the 
rules pertaining to labor aspects of production (Zeitlin 1987: 159). 
2 For the case of US-owned companies, see the overview by Edwards and Ferner (2002). For older 
accounts of IR practices in MNC subsidiaries in Britain and Germany, see, for example, Steuer 
et al. (1973), Buckley and Enderwick (1985), Bomers (1976).
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in the German and British subsidiaries in the period between 1967 and 1985. “Impact” 
denotes influence on the three key dimensions of industrial relations systems (Dunlop 
1958), namely on the attitudes and strategies of actors (management and trade unions), 
on IR processes (scope, style, and arenas), and on substantive and procedural outcomes. 
The case study is based on extensive research in company and trade union archives, on 
the analysis of the contemporary press, and on interviews with former IR managers and 
trade union/works council leaders.3
The choice of an historical perspective may appear surprising given a widespread as-
sumption in the literature that MNC strategies to integrate subsidiaries either did not 
exist prior to the 1990s or did not have much impact because the international macro-
economic framework of “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982) prevented the unfold-
ing of regime competition for internationally mobile capital.4 However, historians have 
used the regime competition concept for a much longer time frame reaching back to 
the late 19th century (Ambrosius 2001). There is also evidence that multinational firms 
used cross-border integration strategies long before the 1990s; if we confine our focus 
to postwar Western Europe such strategies emerged in the early 1960s against the back-
drop of the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Free Trade Association (Jones 2005: 100–101). Ford is a good case study here because 
the company was among the pioneers in this process.
The article demonstrates that this integration process had an important impact on in-
dustrial relations in Ford’s largest European subsidiaries in Britain and Germany from 
1967, the year of the creation of the “Ford of Europe” holding company. To explain this 
impact the article combines the convergence and path dependence approaches with 
a third interpretative framework, which I term “differential internationalization” and 
which is designed to account for the country-specific, gradual changes associated with 
the cross-border integration process. Overall I argue that the impact of subsidiary inte-
gration on actors, processes, and outcomes was stronger in the UK because the British 
subsidiary’s status as a performance “laggard” within the Ford of Europe group entailed 
stronger regime competition pressure than in Germany, and because national actors in 
the UK, more than their German counterparts, appropriated international dynamics 
to pursue strategies for domestic IR change. The latter process was facilitated by the 
fact that national IR institutions in the UK underwent considerable change between 
the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. Still, the Ford of Europe integration had important 
consequences for industrial relations in the German subsidiary, too, as evinced by the 
emergence of “co-management” and the superimposition of co-determination through 
rights by co-determination through contract.
3 To avoid a proliferation of archive-related notes I usually refer to my previously published work, 
where the reader can find full bibliographical information. 
4 The few scholars who did analyze the IR implications of such cross-border integration processes 
prior to the 1990s (see, for example, Kujawa 1971, 1975) tended to unduly downplay their sig-
nificance. 
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The article proceeds as follows: Section two presents the threefold explanatory frame-
work of the study, conceptualizing convergence and path dependence as complementa-
ry approaches, and introducing “differential internationalization” as an additional third 
line of interpretation. Section three provides background information about the IR 
contexts in Britain and Germany, and about Ford’s cross-border integration patterns. 
Section four describes the IR impact of this integration on the British and German 
subsidiaries, and section five, systematically distinguishing between the actor, process, 
and outcome dimensions, accounts for the observed impact by testing the explanatory 
power of the convergence, path dependence, and “differential internationalization” ap-
proaches. In the concluding part the article discusses the implications of the case study 
for contemporary internationalization debates.
2 Conceptual framework: Convergence, path dependence, and differential 
internationalization
As mentioned earlier, convergence theories in the IR field have been associated with 
processes of international economic integration since they were first propounded by 
Dunlop and Kerr in the early postwar period. These early approaches were based on 
the logic of “industrialism” – that is, the cross-border spread of technologies and labor 
process management (Smith 1999: 4–5). In recent years, however, these older ideas have 
been supplanted by a new version of convergence, which is more relevant for the case 
study as it emphasizes the importance of cross-border regime competition for interna-
tionally mobile capital as the key convergence mechanism. Many authors argue that, 
as a result of pan-European subsidiary integration, multinational employers have en-
hanced their capacities to switch investments between countries and to use such threats 
in negotiations with employees and trade unions. In the words of Wolfgang Streeck, 
this has turned competitiveness into the new “hegemonic concept” of European in-
dustrial relations (Streeck 1998: 439). Evidence for this is abundant in the 1990s and 
2000s, in particular with regard to trade union acceptance of wage concessions and/or 
productivity drives in exchange for medium-term employment guarantees against the 
backdrop of international investment competition (Zagelmeyer 2001). In the process, 
industrial relations, next to their function as an instrument of social compromise in 
the workplace, have become closely linked to the economic performance of firms. IR 
agendas now often feature issues beyond the “classic” domains of wages and employee 
welfare, such as investment, outsourcing, or work organization (ibid.). Extending the 
time frame of analysis back toward the period between 1967 and 1985, the article will 
explore whether the beginnings of such convergence processes can be found in cases of 
advanced internationalization like Ford prior to the 1990s.
Recent research has also emphasized the convergence effects that can arise from the 
strengthening of international management structures accompanying processes of 
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cross-border subsidiary integration. A distinction should be made here between simi-
larities resulting from the fact that stronger international management coordination 
pre-empts decision-making procedures and delays negotiations in subsidiaries and 
similarities that are the direct consequence of specific HQ-inspired industrial relations 
policies. From the existing literature it appears that, with regard to the pre-emptive 
properties of coordination, one key consequence has been the growing fear of trade 
unions that they will be “kept in the dark” and lose their institutional influence capaci-
ties, which in turn has led them to demand, and to varying degrees also to achieve, an 
upgrading of labor-management consultation related to issues of corporate strategy. In-
cidentally, these are phenomena which surveys of industrial relations practices in MNC 
subsidiaries noted already in the 1970s (Bomers 1977).
With regard to HQ-inspired industrial relations policies, scholars have pointed to a 
growing trend towards the encouragement of interorganizational learning between 
subsidiaries as a result of HQ initiatives; in a few cases such as IBM, this has even led 
to explicit common personnel policies (Edwards/Ferner 2002: 99). However, this seems 
to be a very recent trend. By contrast, most surveys carried out in the 1970s and 1980s 
emphasized the relative autonomy of subsidiaries in IR matters within a framework of 
indirect HQ control through regular reporting and monitoring, and the “carrot and 
stick” of investment allocation (Kujawa 1971). The case study analysis will test whether 
some form of HQ pressure for institutional convergence can already be found at Ford 
prior to the 1990s.
If convergence theories emphasize similar tendencies of change across countries, path 
dependence theories stress the importance of institutional continuity as a result of dis-
tinct national trajectories. In fact, two different strands of path dependence arguments 
can be distinguished. On the one hand, the term is often used in the sense that long-
established structures and action patterns will influence the choices of actors in the 
present, even in moments of extreme upheaval (“path as legacy” version). On the other 
hand, path dependence is invoked as a key notion of a punctuated equilibrium model, 
which draws a sharp line between brief periods of innovation when a new “path” is 
created and long periods of reproduction once a path has been established (“path as 
punctuated equilibrium” version – see Streeck/Thelen 2005: 6–7).
In many ways, the latter conceptualization is more precise and interesting than the for-
mer; if understood as punctuated equilibrium, path dependence implies institutional 
change at moments of “critical juncture,” and it also raises the question of how institu-
tions are reproduced during “settled” periods. Scholars working within this paradigm of 
path dependence have demonstrated that such reproduction is driven by “positive feed-
back” effects arising, for example, from learning and coordination, from the routinized 
anticipation of other actors’ behavior, or from engrained notions of legitimacy (Deeg 
2005: 171–172). Moreover, institutional reproduction is often encouraged by comple-
mentarities between the interconnected institutional arrangements that together form 
national “varieties of capitalism” (Hall/Soskice 2001).
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From a path dependence perspective, internationalization does not lead to cross-border 
convergence but, on the contrary, to the accentuation of national “paths,” as actors pro-
cess international dynamics in ways that correspond to country-specific patterns. With 
regard to regime competition, for example, Hancké (2000) has demonstrated how much 
different national IR institutions have shaped the outcomes of bargaining in the context 
of investment competition in MNCs. Likewise, HQ attempts at the cross-border transfer 
of IR practices have often been constrained by and “fitted” into the distinct IR patterns of 
different national subsidiaries (Edwards/Ferner 2002: 99–100). As I have already argued, 
convergence and path dependence approaches are not mutually exclusive – IR systems 
have often changed in similar ways across nations while, at the same time, country-spe-
cific institutional arrangements have remained remarkably stable (Smith 1999). Hence, 
both approaches need to be considered when assessing the impact of cross-border sub-
sidiary integration on IR patterns in MNC subsidiaries.
However, a growing body of scholarship suggests that even a combination of “conver-
gence” and “path dependence” is unlikely to fully explain the IR impact of internation-
alization processes. The limits of the path dependence approach have been exposed 
because internationalization has recently been associated with processes of significant, 
yet gradual, change to national institutions that cannot be accommodated in either a 
“path as legacy” or a “path as punctuated equilibrium” version of path dependence. Such 
gradual change often occurs through shifting forms of “practical enactment” (Streeck/
Thelen 2005: 18) of apparently stable institutional structures. It can take different 
forms, such as “layering,” when new logics of action and institutional arrangements are 
superimposed on older ones, or “conversion,” when institutions are redirected to new 
functions or purposes (see ibid.: 22–29). For example, in a study of the impact of com-
pany-level “pacts for employment” on German industrial relations in the 1990s, Rehder 
(2003), putting strong emphasis on internationalization dynamics, found considerable 
evidence for such layering and conversion processes with regard to co-determination 
and the interaction between company and industry bargaining. A careful analysis of 
such processes is all the more necessary since the accumulation of gradual change may 
in turn lead to more far-reaching, path-altering transformations.
Convergence theories are in principle better able to accommodate incremental change, 
yet often incremental change does not entail a convergence dynamic. Internationaliza-
tion can have effects that lead to similar shifts in different countries, but this is not 
necessarily the case and, moreover, while convergence effects might operate on one level 
of institutions, they might not do so on others. Internationalization dynamics often af-
fect countries to different degrees, and national actors “appropriate” such dynamics in 
specific ways depending on the strategic importance that internationalization acquires 
in domestic arenas (Schmidt 2007).
Scholars analyzing IR patterns in multinational firms have also emphasized the need to 
go beyond the simplistic picture of an interaction between host country constraints and 
convergence pressures emanating from the MNC headquarters (Ferner/Tempel 2006). 
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What their analyses demonstrate is that it is useful to complement convergence and 
path dependence approaches with a third interpretative framework, for which I suggest 
the term “differential internationalization.” The key assumption of this approach is that 
there is a third “portion” of how international subsidiary integration in MNCs affects 
national industrial relations, which is likely to be country-specific rather than uniform, 
and which is likely to entail gradual IR change rather than mere institutional reproduc-
tion or radical transformation.
A good starting point to reflect upon the “differential” character of this dynamic is to 
abandon the assumption that the strategies pursued by MNC headquarter manage-
ment are necessarily uniform. In other words, even if a set of more or less coherent HQ 
objectives does exist – which is in itself not obvious (Kristensen/Zeitlin 2005) – this 
will not necessarily translate into a uniform set of policies. HQ management may opt 
for a differential approach instead. Most importantly, the transfer of institutional IR 
practices within MNCs is likely to reflect the performance hierarchy of national econo-
mies – HQ “advice” based on some idea of international “best practice” is likely to be 
strongest in subsidiaries at the bottom of international “league tables” (Ferner/Tempel 
2006: 30), while better-performing subsidiaries may even enjoy “dominance effects” 
(Smith/Meiskins 1995). Other reasons for a differential HQ approach include the im-
portance of specific national markets, the HQ location, or “divide-and rule” tactics, the 
effectiveness of which may be jeopardized by international trade union cooperation in 
response to strongly centralized HQ strategies.
The differentiality argument can be given added weight if we factor in the role of actors 
in national subsidiaries. There is much emphasis in the recent literature on portraying 
subsidiaries not as passive “rule-takers” but as important players within the corporate 
group – because of their capacity to “appropriate” HQ strategies (Birkinshaw 2000). 
HQ initiatives may be frustrated because of subsidiary resistance or token implemen-
tation without “internalization” (Kostova 1999). On the other hand, initiatives for the 
cross-border transfer of IR practices may originate from national subsidiaries them-
selves (Ferner/Tempel 2006: 30).
Clearly, national subsidiaries cannot be conceptualized as homogenous actors in such 
processes; the fractioning of firms into “competing social forces” (Amoore 2000) ap-
plies to MNCs in a double sense. On the one hand, national subsidiary actors may 
indeed in some respects define themselves as a coalition with shared interests vis-à-vis 
the HQ and other subsidiaries. On the other hand, however, there will be a dimen-
sion of conflict between different actors at the local and national levels; research on 
concession bargaining in MNC subsidiaries in the late 1990s, for example, shows clear 
evidence of conflict between subsidiary management and employee representatives, 
and also between different groups of workers and trade unionists (Rehder 2003: ch. 6). 
Subsidiary actors may even consciously use internationalization dynamics to improve 
their domestic positions over other actors, or they may be perceived to do so. These 
and other forms of “appropriation” are likely to entail some form of change – actors 
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may reformulate their interests and give new meanings to established institutions, or 
use internationalization as a bargaining lever against domestic opponents. At the same 
time, change is likely to vary across countries, depending on the specific interaction 
between internationalization and the IR dynamics in national subsidiaries. Incidentally, 
this focus on “appropriation” allows changing actor interpretations and identities to be 
illuminated much more systematically than would be possible with the “convergence” 
or “path dependence” approaches. This is important because it helps to address a fur-
ther dimension of cross-border subsidiary integration, namely the opening up of a new 
space of observation and communication for national IR actors. As we shall see, actor 
perceptions of subsidiary integration processes can be of crucial importance for gradual 
change in national IR patterns, as can the comparative look at IR practices in other 
subsidiaries/countries and “externality” effects such as the cross-border repercussions 
of strikes in particular national subsidiaries (Fetzer 2003).5
The picture becomes still more complex if we consider company patterns to be con-
nected with evolving macro-level national institutions. Management and trade unions 
in an MNC subsidiary – whether acting in concert or not – may use their national “envi-
ronments” as a resource to accommodate or resist HQ initiatives, or to improve the sub-
sidiary’s position within the MNC network, e.g., through lobbies for investment grants 
or through exploiting national regulatory requirements and infrastructure resources 
(Kristensen/Zeitlin 2005: ch. 3). On the other hand, MNC subsidiary actors may seek to 
implant institutional innovations in national systems by taking advantage of “niches” 
and/or by advocating change to the macro-level institutional framework, for example 
through intervention in public debates, government lobbying, or the setting of local 
precedents (Ferner/Tempel 2006: 28–29). Again, these processes are likely to become 
a source of change for IR patterns in national subsidiaries, though, at the same time, 
change is likely to play out differently in different countries, depending, for example, on 
the degree to which national IR systems are under pressure to change.
To sum up, the “differential internationalization” approach assumes that the IR impact 
of cross-border subsidiary integration in MNCs will vary between countries, yet main-
tains that this variation cannot solely be accounted for by different national “receiving 
conditions,” as path dependence theories would suggest. Instead, the analysis must also 
take into account how IR patterns in subsidiaries, in dealing with the new international 
challenges, undergo a transformation themselves. Below, this framework will be applied 
to the case study of Ford UK and Germany between 1967 and 1985.
5 A further important aspect of this dimension, initiatives for cross-border trade union coopera-
tion, is not discussed here, as the focus of this paper is on the impact of internationalization on 
national IR processes. 
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3 Industrial relations at Ford UK and Germany 1967–1985: The context
The British and German postwar industrial relations systems
Considering the development of industrial relations in Britain and Germany in the Cold 
War era, one is struck by the structural and institutional differences between the two 
countries, on the one hand, and by the contrast between relative stability in Germany 
and radical change in the UK, on the other. With regard to structural differences, one key 
aspect was that the relationship between employers and trade unions in the UK was em-
bedded in a pluralist notion of interest representation implying an adversarial approach 
on both “sides of industry” (Fox 1983). Thatcherism weakened the trade union side in the 
1980s, yet failed to produce a partnership model of industrial relations. Indeed, today still, 
despite many efforts made by “New Labour,” many British IR scholars doubt that such a 
shift has generally occurred (Marchington/Goodman/Berridge 2004). In the Federal Re-
public (FRG), by contrast, a social partnership model came to prevail after the mid-1950s 
– a conscious response to the agonizing class conflicts of the Weimar Republic (Hyman 
2001: 50), but also a reflection of the Cold War context, when many trade unions excluded 
Communists from leadership positions (Schmidt 1970). The late 1960s witnessed the re-
volt of a new union generation against overly harmonious visions of partnership, yet this 
did not radically question the “German model.” It was only after the end of the Cold War 
that the model lost some of its appeal, particularly among German employers, though 
there is a great deal of debate about the degree of this shift (Streeck/Hassel 2004).
The divergence of actor approaches was reinforced by contrasting IR institutions. In 
Germany, two-tier co-determination at the company level was institutionally separated 
from collective bargaining at industry level. In many companies there was an unofficial 
second round of negotiations, but it was not until the mid-1980s that this arena ac-
quired a significant role in the regulation of employment conditions (see Streeck 1994). 
This pattern contrasted with the situation in the UK: Against the backdrop of a de-
centralization trend, industrial bargaining declined after the 1950s, while no statutory 
instruments of employee representation existed until the 1990s. More generally, prior to 
Thatcher’s arrival in Downing Street, the role of collective labor law in IR regulation was 
far less important than in the Federal Republic – collective bargaining agreements had 
no legal force, and peacefully striking workers and their representatives were granted 
immunity from criminal or civil prosecution (Davies/Freedland 1993). Conservative 
legislation brought fundamental change to this “voluntarist” pattern in the 1980s, but 
did not move to a rights-based system as in Germany (Howell 2005).
As these observations indicate, British IR developments in the Cold War period were 
much more discontinuous than in Germany. Reform debates became widespread in the 
UK after the mid-1960s against the backdrop of a new, “Fordist” employer concern with 
productivity while, at the same time, full employment increased the bargaining power 
of workers and unions, resulting in the proliferation of wildcat strikes in defiance of 
dispute procedures (Middlemas 1990).
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The government’s appointment of a Royal Commission under Lord Donovan in 1965 
opened a period of controversial debates about the reform of British IR. Many em-
ployers advocated a departure from voluntarism by placing legal restrictions on strikes, 
and while such ideas were not taken up by the Donovan Commission they did become 
influential subsequently: The Labour cabinet’s White Paper “In Place of Strife” in 1969 
and the Tory government’s Industrial Relations Act of 1971 were attempts in this direc-
tion, which ultimately failed because of union resistance (Crouch 1977). The “Social 
Contract” on return of a Labour government in 1974 only led to a temporary truce; 
the economic crisis in the wake of the oil shock effectively buried the “contract,” while 
union militancy increased again in protest at pay restraint and the erosion of wage dif-
ferentials. A further field of debate emerged with the proceedings of the Bullock Com-
mittee in 1975 and 1976 about the possible statutory introduction of worker directors 
on company boards (Howell 2005: ch. 4). Finally, after the “Winter of Discontent” in 
1978/79 had paved Thatcher’s way into office, her Conservative governments embarked 
on radical legislative change that focused on the restriction of strike immunities and the 
anchoring of financial union liability for workplace disputes. Legislation was backed up 
by confrontations with unions in the public sector, notably with the miners in 1984/85. 
The result was not just a new legal framework but the marginalization of unions and 
collective bargaining altogether (ibid.: ch. 5).
Compared to these turbulent developments, the situation in the FRG remained much 
more stable throughout the period between 1967 and 1985. Given the social partner-
ship tradition, the conflict-constraining character of IR institutions, and the more lim-
ited nature of economic difficulties, the potential for discontent was generally lower. 
IR reform debates were controversial, yet not to the same degree as in the UK. Insti-
tutional reforms culminated in the amendment of the Works Council Act in 1972 and 
the new Mitbestimmungsgesetz in 1976, providing for parity representation of employee 
delegates on the supervisory boards of large German firms (Schneider 2000: 347–348). 
German employers opposed the latter reform bitterly, yet they grudgingly accepted the 
new situation. At the same time, there occurred important yet gradual changes in the 
practice of Mitbestimmung (see Jackson 2005). Unlike the Thatcherite onslaught in 
Britain, the conservative turn of German government policy in the early 1980s entailed 
rather little change, notwithstanding strong union anxieties to the contrary. The most 
significant development occurred in the collective bargaining arena, namely the onset 
of a trend towards decentralization, and the concomitant rise of works councils as bar-
gaining agents in many firms (Streeck/Hassel 2004: 105).
Ford’s European reorganization: Towards cross-border subsidiary integration
June 1967 marked a fundamental transformation of the Ford Motor Company’s Euro-
pean operations. The traditional reliance on two parallel organizations in Britain and 
Germany was abandoned in favor of cross-border subsidiary integration, backed by a 
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new international management structure, the holding company Ford of Europe located 
in Warley/Essex (Tolliday 2003a: 182–185). Ford of Europe was organized along func-
tional reporting structures, which interfered with the autonomy of national subsidiar-
ies despite the fact that the latter retained their legal independence (Harbridge House 
Europe 1984: I, 1–3).
The main task of the new organization was to integrate the British and German sub-
sidiaries in terms of product development, manufacturing, and sales. In product de-
velopment, the two centers in Dunton (UK) and Cologne-Merkenich (Germany) were 
thoroughly reorganized into new European groups, and by 1972 Ford disposed of a 
largely standardized European vehicle range featuring the Escort, Capri, Cortina/Tau-
nus, and Consul/Granada models (see Tolliday 2003a: 190–191). In the mid-1970s the 
range was extended by the small model Fiesta. In manufacturing, one crucial change 
was that now several production plants shared the final assembly of the same models. 
The Cortina/Taunus and the Granada/Consul ranges were produced in the oldest Ford 
plants at Dagenham (East London) and Cologne-Niehl, while the Escort was assembled 
at Halewood (Liverpool) and Genk (Belgium),6 and from 1970 also in a second German 
plant at Saarlouis. Parallel to this, an extensive cross-border exchange of components 
was put in place. Halewood, for example, supplied gearboxes to continental plants while 
receiving press panels from Genk and Saarlouis. As for marketing, the German and Brit-
ish subsidiaries, instead of selling cars independently of each other, now represented 
Ford of Europe exclusively in some countries while being barred from sales in others.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, cross-border subsidiary integration was further rein-
forced. On the one hand, the European network was extended – a new “Iberian” pillar 
with assembly and manufacturing operations in Valencia (Spain) and component pro-
duction in Bordeaux (France) complemented the German and British operations. On 
the other hand, Ford of Europe’s influence over national subsidiaries further increased 
with a number of pan-European initiatives, most importantly the so-called “After Japan” 
program, which focused on the lessons Ford needed to draw from the competitive chal-
lenge posed by Japanese firms (Starkey/McKinlay 1994).
The balance between the German and British subsidiaries clearly shifted in favor of the 
former between 1967 and 1985, with the notable exception of the product development 
division, where Ford UK retained a slight numerical dominance. The British share of 
Ford’s European car production fell from 55–60 percent in the late 1960s to about 20–
25 percent in the mid-1980s. By contrast, the German share grew from 40–45 to around 
60 percent in the late 1970s, before slightly dropping to 55 percent in the early 1980s 
as a result of competition from the new Spanish operation, which now accounted for 
some 15–20 percent of Ford’s annual European output (Tolliday 2003b: 144). On the 
one hand, these shifts reflected the diverging performance of the British and German 
motor industries during this period – the industry became the paradigm case of the 
6 The Genk plant was operationally integrated into the German Ford subsidiary. 
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export-led “German economic miracle,” while the deteriorating position of British car 
firms epitomized the country’s much-debated “decline” (Whisler 1999). On the other 
hand, Ford also pursued a “slow and deliberate policy” of reducing Ford of Europe’s 
dependence on its UK manufacturing base, expressed, for example, in the conscious 
decision to concentrate larger and higher value-added models in Germany (Harbridge 
House Europe 1984: VIII, 10).
The creation of Ford of Europe initially did not entail deliberate attempts at European 
harmonization of IR practices; as noted by contemporary observers such as Kujawa 
(1971), the IR function remained one of the most decentralized areas within Ford’s new 
European structures. However, Ford of Europe played an active role in “counseling” 
national subsidiaries in labor issues (Friedman/Meredeen 1980: 37–40), although, as we 
shall see, this mattered to different degrees in the two countries. A shift towards more 
pan-European initiatives did not emerge before the early 1980s, when the “After Japan” 
program was combined with the transfer of concession bargaining from the United 
States to European subsidiaries (Rehder 2003: 68).
4 Internationalization of industrial relations at Ford UK and Germany
United Kingdom
In the British Ford subsidiary, the impact of European reorganization was felt soon after 
1967, which was not least the result of an emerging dynamic of regime competition. 
Ford started to use its enhanced “exit” options strategically to reduce its dependence on 
a UK manufacturing base, claiming time and again that this was primarily a reaction to 
the industrial relations problems it encountered in the UK. After nine weeks of strikes 
in 1971, Henry Ford II notoriously commented that he “could not in good conscience 
recommend to [his] Board any new capital expenditure in Britain” (cited in Tolliday 
2003b: 95). One should be wary of taking such claims at face value because Ford did 
continue to invest in the UK, and also because there were other reasons for the Brit-
ish subsidiary’s problems, such as the comparatively low growth of domestic demand 
and the UK’s belated entry into the European Community. However, there can be little 
doubt that German–British IR comparisons did play a role in the downgrading of Ford 
UK during the 1970s (Fetzer 2003).
Regardless of the degree to which investment decisions were influenced by IR consider-
ations, Ford’s new exit options also enabled the company to deploy the threat of invest-
ment diversion as a bargaining instrument. To back up these threats, Ford developed 
techniques of European productivity comparison, which became an almost permanent 
device of management after the late 1960s (Beynon 1984: ch. 11). They were presented 
as illustrations of the “gap” that needed to be closed in order to “earn” more investment; 
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in practical terms they were employed to counter union wage claims, as well as to urge 
revisions of workplace practices (e.g. manning, work standards). Still more important 
was the link between productivity and strikes, in particular with regard to wildcat dis-
putes, which were branded as the “British disease,” preventing steady production flows 
that were essential to exploit the scale economies of mass car manufacturing. Frequent-
ly, Ford management coupled such exhortations to investment boycott threats, in order 
to increase the pressure on trade union negotiators. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
there was a certain shift towards emphasizing challenges and investment opportunities 
rather than threats, yet regime competition continued to be used as a major bargaining 
tool by Ford UK management (ibid.).
These management bargaining strategies were closely connected to the parallel national 
debates about British economic “decline” (Tomlinson 2000). In fact, events at Ford often 
became national “issues” as they were promoted to center stage in the national media 
and repeatedly discussed in the House of Commons. Ford’s productivity comparisons 
between plants in different European countries played a crucial role in the numerous 
national inquiries into the crisis of the motor industry after the collapse of British Ley-
land in 1974/75. Even Prime Ministers Wilson and Heath became personally involved in 
Ford IR matters (Fetzer 2005: 140–142, 156–158, 197–198).
The regime competition dynamic resulting from Ford’s European reorganization also 
became intertwined with management attempts at institutional IR changes which fo-
cused on strategies to reduce the incidence of wildcat strikes in the British subsidiary. 
This involved pressure to change IR and trade union procedures following the examples 
of the more “orderly” German and US systems. As the former Ford UK labor director 
Paul Roots put it: “In Britain, Ford tried for a long time to persuade British unions to 
act like American unions […] After the creation of Ford of Europe, we also started to 
look at German industrial relations” (Roots 1984: 15–16). One idea which was brought 
up time and again in this respect was to induce British unions to discipline workers par-
ticipating in wildcat strikes, for example through an agreement to replace such workers 
with groups of volunteers.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ford also supported the reform of British IR at the 
national level as an indirect way to change company-level industrial relations. Euro-
pean reorganization again played an important role in this process. On the one hand, 
Ford consistently lobbied for more legal restrictions on strikes in meetings with govern-
ment ministers. In 1970/71, for example, company officials strongly encouraged Prime 
Minister Heath to pursue his US-inspired agenda of IR reform, emphasizing the need 
for more “orderly” industrial relations to improve Ford UK’s position in the competi-
tion for investment with other European subsidiaries (Fetzer 2005: 164). On the other 
hand, Ford tried to set a legal precedent in February 1969 when the company sought 
a court injunction against a strike call by the two largest unions TGWU and AEU on 
the grounds that bargaining agreements, once concluded, were legally enforceable. This 
represented a frontal attack on a core tenet of voluntarism, the non-legal character of 
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collective contracts, and the move was widely interpreted as being the result of instruc-
tions from Ford of Europe. Many trade union representatives also suspected a link be-
tween Ford’s challenge to voluntarism and the parallel debates about the Labour gov-
ernment’s “In Place of Strife” (Friedman/Meredeen 1980: 226–228). However, Ford lost 
the court case, and subsequent government efforts to “legalize” British IR failed because 
of trade union resistance.
More generally, management pressure based on European productivity benchmarking 
had little effect until the mid-1970s; apart from a few exceptional instances, British 
trade unions resisted such concession bargaining tactics, most graphically expressed 
in the successful campaign for wage parity with Midlands motor firms in 1971 in the 
face of investment boycott threats (Mathews 1972). Defending their militancy, union 
representatives argued that the “productivity gap” vis-à-vis Ford’s continental plants 
primarily reflected an “investment gap” – according to this logic, the key to higher effi-
ciency lay with the company itself rather than with workers and trade unions. Likewise, 
management attempts to interfere with internal union procedures to reduce wildcat 
disputes were rejected. The fact that it was management that extolled the virtues of 
German and US practices was sufficient to ensure union hostility. Moreover, there was 
a popular notion of Britain as the birthplace of modern trade unionism and a concom-
itant widespread condescension towards American and German IR practices (Fetzer 
2005: 217–218).
Following the oil crisis and the state takeover of British Leyland in 1974/75, “moderate” 
trade union voices became louder. A number of union officials participated in tripar-
tite “study trips” to Ford’s continental car plants and actively supported government 
efforts to entice the investment of a new Ford engine plant to Wales in 1977 (Beynon 
1984: 334–339). However, these were still rather isolated instances of cooperation, which, 
moreover, were fiercely criticized from within the Ford trade union organization. Real 
change only came about in the late 1970s against the backdrop of growing unemploy-
ment and the popular appeal of Thatcher’s pledge to curb trade union power in order to 
restore Britain’s economic strength (Tomlinson 2000). Ford management’s emphasis on 
the need to catch up with productivity levels in other European subsidiaries now found 
a stronger resonance among employees and hence undermined resistance to concession 
bargaining tactics. Though such resistance still erupted intermittently during the early 
1980s, trade unions at Ford UK now generally accepted management arguments relat-
ing to investment competition with other European Ford locations, as expressed in sev-
eral agreements to reduce the number of industrial disputes and to reform workplace 
practices (Fetzer 2005: 255–260).
The impact of European cross-border subsidiary integration on IR at Ford UK was not 
confined to regime competition. Independently of management pressure for conces-
sion bargaining, the trade unions started to apply pressure on the company for a widen-
ing of IR agendas to include issues of corporate planning from the late 1960s onwards. 
This reflected recurrent uncertainty over Ford of Europe’s impact on future employ-
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ment prospects, as much as the need to obtain information about trading and transfer 
price systems for the preparation of collective bargaining. The demand for more and 
better information and consultation on corporate planning turned into a staple of trade 
union positions at Ford UK. White-collar unions representing technicians and clerical 
staff were particularly active in this regard (Fetzer 2005: 164–168).
However, the company showed no inclination to accept regular consultation arrange-
ments until the mid-1970s. Indeed, arguments over what kind of information relat-
ing to international company strategies the unions were entitled to obtain became a 
permanent bone of contention itself. For their part, the trade unions tried to enlist the 
support of “external” actors. Ford shop stewards approached government ministers to 
obtain information about Ford of Europe. Public campaigns and the lobby of members 
of parliament were organized to force Ford to disclose future business plans, or even 
to alter them in line with trade union aspirations. In 1976, for example, a union lobby 
of MPs contributed to an upgrading of the production for the new model Fiesta in the 
UK. There was also widespread support for a TUC campaign to improve legal rights 
to information disclosure in multinational firms. A minority led by the technicians’ 
union DATA wanted to go further, making strident, though largely unsuccessful, ef-
forts for more government control over Ford and other multinational firms, through 
such instruments as so-called “planning agreements” (ibid.: 132–135, 200–204). Finally, 
there was the Bullock Report and the issue of worker directors. Only a minority within 
the Ford trade union organization actively supported this demand; the skepticism of 
the majority was not least nurtured by comparative observations of German co-de-
termination. Ford UK management strictly opposed the implementation of any board 
participation schemes, yet by the mid-1970s eventually agreed to improve consultation 
procedures as part of a limited move towards “management by consent” (Friedman/
Meredeen 1980: 246–247).
Industrial relations at Ford UK between 1967 and 1985 were also influenced by the 
growing interdependence between national subsidiaries, most importantly with regard 
to strikes. Ford’s new system of cross-border deliveries made the company more vul-
nerable to disruption, and British unions exploited this new opportunity. Union tactics 
were often designed to ensure a rapid breakdown of cross-border transactions to in-
crease bargaining pressure on the company; in the product development division, this 
could take the form of a ban on liaising with German personnel, while in manufactur-
ing it mostly meant the blockade of component deliveries from British to continen-
tal plants. In the initial period especially, this tactic was crucial in securing bargaining 
concessions, yet from the late 1970s onwards, in line with the shift towards “moderate” 
trade union positions, it was less frequently used than before (Fetzer 2003).
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Germany
In contrast to the UK, regime competition was not a major issue for industrial relations 
at Ford Germany until the late 1970s. There was no significant management pressure 
for concession bargaining, apart from an ill-designed and abortive initiative to reduce 
the annual summer holiday from four to three weeks in line with practice in the UK. In-
deed, Ford of Europe managers and Henry Ford II himself often praised German work-
ers – much to the dismay of the trade unions and the works council, who complained 
that Ford should pay higher wages to its German employees rather than lip service to 
good industrial relations (Fetzer 2009: 115).
It was only in the late 1970s that the situation slowly changed. From about 1977, Ford 
management started to complain about “high German wage costs” that were allegedly 
hampering future investment prospects. Several appreciations of the Deutschmark vis-
à-vis the pound and the opening of the Spanish plant in Valencia turned Germany into 
Ford’s European “high-cost location.” Senior Ford of Europe managers publicly claimed 
that cost competition, which favored the British and Spanish sites, would become more 
important in the future. The decision to build a new engine plant in Wales rather than 
in Germany was quoted as a warning example.7 There was also more pressure on the 
local works councils to either grant overtime requests or face the prospect of partial 
production relocation to the UK or Spain.
In the early 1980s these pressures intensified as Ford moved to a pan-European ap-
proach to concession bargaining (Rehder 2003: 68). This occurred for the first time in 
the negotiations over labor-related aspects of the “After Japan” program in 1980. Of 
more far-reaching importance was the fact that Ford started to use the decentralization 
of German collective bargaining as a lever for concession bargaining. In the 1984 nego-
tiations over the implementation of reduced working time in the metal industry, Ford 
insisted on a daily reduction pattern, emphasizing that this was the only way to avoid a 
further labor cost disadvantage of German plants vis-à-vis other European Ford loca-
tions.8 In 1985, Ford of Europe management threatened to relocate a large part of Ford 
Germany’s product development division to the UK, and it was only possible to avert 
this threat because local subsidiary managers and works councilors jointly developed 
alternative plans for cost reduction, which, however, involved significant employment 
cutbacks and wage concessions.9 German labor representatives actively participated in 
the management of competitiveness from the late 1970s onwards, which contrasted 
with the British pattern of union weakness and compliance.
7 “Verbund für die ganze Welt,” Managermagazin 5/1978.
8 “Bericht des GBR zur Betriebsversammlung IV. Quartal 1984,” file “BR Ford-N ab Jan. 83,” Ar-
chives of IG Metall, Cologne, 
9 “Fordwerke AG, Vereinbarung zwischen dem Vorstand und dem Gesamtbetriebsrat der Ford-
Werke Aktiengesellschaft über einen Restrukturierungsplan für den Zeitraum 1986 bis 1990, 10. 
Oktober 1985,” Archives of the HRM Department at Fordwerke AG, Cologne. 
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Compared to the British situation, the absence of management attempts to alter IR in-
stitutions is also notable. In the literature concerned with the IR approaches adopted by 
the German subsidiaries of US firms it is often claimed that they have had a tendency 
to avoid or reduce the impact of industry bargaining and co-determination (Colling et 
al. 2006). In the case of Ford this only applies to the early postwar period. Under pres-
sure from an IG Metall organizing drive, Ford decided to join the regional employer 
association in 1963, a decision driven by Ford Germany’s IR management despite some 
reluctance in Detroit (Wittemann 1994). During the 1960s and 1970s, Ford of Europe 
and Ford US continued to occasionally question the usefulness of industry-level bar-
gaining; however, German subsidiary management insisted that this was important to 
shield Ford from IG Metall attacks.10 In the early 1980s, as we have seen, a degree of de-
centralization did indeed occur, but this did not entail Ford’s withdrawal from industry 
bargaining. Rather, agreements such as the one related to the restructuring of product 
development in 1985 institutionalized company bargaining as an additional source of 
regulation of employment conditions, which supplemented industry bargaining.
With regard to co-determination, Ford did not adopt a hostile position either. The 
relatively cooperative relationship with the works council gave little reason to ques-
tion this institution; indeed, in the co-determination debate of the early to mid-1970s, 
senior Ford managers went on record as being in favor of parity co-determination on 
supervisory boards, even though it was emphasized that worker representatives should 
not include external trade union delegates. In 1974, Ford of Europe recommended its 
German subsidiary to lobby politically against supervisory board parity, but otherwise 
concluded that “the movement towards co-determination in Europe is accelerating fast 
and is inevitable” (Fetzer 2009: 119).
Regardless of the absence of conscious company moves to alter German IR institutions, 
the creation of Ford of Europe had a number of “collateral” effects upsetting indus-
trial relations procedures at Fordwerke. There was, for example, the problem of posted 
foreign managers. Most British and US managers sent to Cologne in the late 1960s 
spoke little German and were not familiar with the complicated legal requirements of 
co-determination. Almost inevitably this led to clashes with labor representatives, as, 
for example, with regard to issues such as overtime work. Protests at the behavior of 
individual managers often turned into a more general criticism of Ford of Europe. In 
February 1970, for instance, the leadership of the local Ford trade union organization 
categorically requested clear guidelines for foreign managers, obliging them “to be fa-
miliar with the German language, mentality and legal order” (ibid.: 110).
More structurally, the creation of Ford of Europe entailed constraints for manpower 
planning in the subsidiary. Tight monitoring of national headcount levels by the Euro-
pean holding meant that consultation on such issues always had a provisional character, 
triggering repeated works council complaints that German management was no longer 
10 Memo “Ford Germany membership in employer association,” 6 June  1984, in: ibid. 
Fetzer: Beyond Convergence versus Path Dependence 21
“master in its own house.” Still more importantly, the shift of strategic decision-making 
to the European level reduced the power of the German subsidiary’s supervisory board 
– and hence the effectiveness of co-determination. Discontent with these IR implica-
tions of European reorganization nurtured a strong attachment on the part of German 
labor representatives to Fordwerke’s autonomy, which they felt needed to be defended 
against European centralization (Fetzer 2009: 111).
Against this backdrop, the Fordwerke works council soon started to press for the adap-
tation of IR procedures that would reduce Ford of Europe interventions, while, at the 
same time, allowing organized labor to have some institutional involvement in Euro-
pean planning decisions. To some extent this was a parallel to British unions’ lobbying 
to widen IR agendas, yet, unlike their UK counterparts, German labor representatives 
did not target “external” actors (government, media, and the like) but sought informal 
company-level arrangements to supplement co-determination. And, again in contrast 
to the UK, German subsidiary management was quite willing to accommodate these 
demands. In the product development division, for example, employee unrest over 
cross-border relocation in 1968 and 1969 led to the conclusion of a specific agreement 
providing for works council consultation prior to European restructuring measures. 
Moreover, German managers with strategic Ford of Europe positions agreed to hold 
regular meetings with works council leaders. While this did not alter the structural lim-
its of co-determination, it did provide new instruments for the works council to deal 
with the new European environment. At the same time, yet again in complete contrast 
to the UK, the new arrangements reinforced labor–management cooperation rather 
than conflict (ibid.: 116).
In fact, social partnership partly turned into “national partnership” – the improvement 
of Fordwerke’s position within the European network became a major joint objective of 
works council and German management throughout the 1970s. In this respect, works 
council leaders and German IR managers also started to perceive legal co-determina-
tion rights as a buffer to resist or modify Ford of Europe decisions that appeared to run 
counter to Fordwerke interests. In 1973, typically, the Cologne works council chairman 
publicly lobbied for extended co-determination not to strengthen labor’s voice vis-à-vis 
capital, but to increase the weight of German management positions within the Euro-
pean holding (ibid.: 115).
This did not mean that there were no conflicts. Fordwerke’s senior management grew 
increasingly impatient about persistent works council demands for a return to the era of 
“German independence,” especially when they were voiced in works assemblies or, very 
rarely, in the press. In their turn, labor representatives never ceased to complain about 
the lack of German management initiative to change Ford of Europe’s model policy and 
budgetary control. However, these were conflicts of a much more limited nature than 
in the UK – and they were firmly embedded in a shared commitment to strengthen the 
role of the German subsidiary within Ford of Europe.
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“National partnership” was further accentuated by the experience of international bar-
gaining and strike interdependence. Since 1968, industrial conflicts at Ford UK led to 
frequent disruptions of component deliveries, causing lay-offs and short-time work. 
While publicly refraining from open criticism of British unions, German labor rep-
resentatives complained that they were supposed to bear the brunt of foreign indus-
trial relations struggles. Works council leaders showed no inclination to support British 
unions by solidarity actions. Instead they happily concurred with Fordwerke manage-
ment plans to exploit such opportunities to lobby for more Ford of Europe investment 
in Germany. For example, during the 1971 dispute, works council and management in 
Saarlouis asked for an engine plant to make assembly less dependent on British sources 
and the “British disease” – the label frequently used to describe labor relations in the UK 
(Fetzer 2009: 112). Works council representatives and management also made joint ef-
forts to secure the payment of benefits by the labor exchange for German Ford workers 
put on short-time work as a result of strikes in the UK. On one occasion, this led to a 
serious clash with the national IG Metall leadership, who argued that German taxpayers 
could not be expected to cover the losses Ford incurred because of its integrated Euro-
pean business structure.11
More than in the UK, European reorganization also had an impact on internal union 
politics at Ford Germany. European managers and strategies were often strongly criti-
cized in works assemblies, at times the portrayal of the European holding as “our com-
mon enemy” was used to overcome divisions within the local union organization.12 In 
the late 1970s, Ford of Europe also became an issue in works council elections; moder-
ate leaders increasingly defended their cooperative stance by pointing to the “impera-
tives” of regime competition against other European Ford locations. This pattern was 
to intensify in the early 1980s – “co-management” in the name of “national interests” 
became the dominant approach of works council politics at Ford Germany.
5 Beyond convergence versus path dependence: Explaining the  
 internationalization of industrial relations at Ford UK and Germany
The case study evidence demonstrates that the cross-border integration of Ford’s Eu-
ropean operations had a considerable impact on industrial relations in the British and 
German subsidiaries from the late 1960s onwards. It is time now to go back to the three-
fold explanatory framework presented earlier and ask to what extent the convergence, 
path dependence, and differential internationalization approaches are able to account 
for the observed impact. As highlighted in the introduction, it is useful here to separate 
11 “Ford steht still, wer bezahlt?”, Welt am Sonntag, November 12, 1978
12 “Bericht über die Vertrauensleutevollkonferenz der Fordwerke, 9 September 1973,” in: Archiv 
der sozialen Demokratie Bonn, Bestand IG Metall, Abteilung Tarifpolitik, 941a.
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the case study evidence into the three key dimensions of industrial relations systems, 
that is, to differentiate subsidiary integration in terms of its impact on actor attitudes 
and strategies (management and trade unions), on IR processes (scope, arenas, and 
styles of interaction), and on substantive and procedural outcomes.
Starting with the actor dimension, the convergence approach provides greater insight 
for the period following the late 1970s than for the first Ford of Europe decade. On the 
management side, it was only in the UK that regime competition was used as a bar-
gaining strategy through “exit” (relocation) and “voice” (relocation threats) in this first 
decade. The same holds true for management attempts to change specific IR practices as 
a result of international coordination (strike regulation). From around 1978, however, 
Ford management started to use regime competition as a bargaining tool in Germany, 
too, which at least in part reflected stronger subsidiary integration and more interna-
tional management coordination, expressed, for example, in the transfer of US-style 
concession bargaining to European subsidiaries. That apart, regime competition pres-
sure still remained stronger in the UK than in Germany during the early 1980s.
On the trade union side, a similar picture emerges. Until 1977/78 neither German nor 
British trade unions showed any signs of wariness about the potential effects of their ac-
tions on the competitiveness of the national subsidiaries. In the German case, there was 
hardly any management pressure in this direction, while, in the UK, as we have seen, the 
trade unions responded to strong pressure with strategies of resistance, which tended 
to increase, rather than diminish, the militancy of British trade unions. Change set in 
after the late 1970s as trade unions were driven on the defensive. However, this process 
played out differently in the two countries: active participation in the management of 
competitiveness in Germany contrasted with a pattern of compliance punctuated by 
occasional bouts of conflict in the UK.
The only continuous element of convergence supported by the case study evidence is 
the fact that cross-border subsidiary integration led to more trade union anxiety over 
employment prospects and the potential loss of institutional influence. This attitude 
also translated into a similar strategic objective, namely the upgrading of consultation 
over corporate strategy. However, union lobbies in this direction found different insti-
tutional outlets in the two countries.
“Path dependence” can help to account for some of these and other observed differ-
ences, thus complementing, rather than contradicting, convergence notions. In its “path 
as legacy” variant it makes the different institutional avenues of trade union lobbying 
for consultation plausible. German trade unions pushed for the adaptation of works 
council co-determination, while the majority of British labor representatives preferred 
the extension of collective bargaining to experiments with worker directors – though 
the skepticism towards the latter option probably reflected national traditions as much 
as negative assessments of German Mitbestimmung. Longer-term historical legacies also 
go a long way to explain the adversarial outlook of management and trade unions in 
24 MPIfG Working Paper 09/3
the UK, as opposed to the commitment to partnership in Germany. Indeed, these differ-
ences were even reinforced through “positive feedback” (as predicted by the punctuated 
equilibrium model of path dependence), given that the new international environment 
offered additional incentives to pursue traditional strategies, and made expectations as 
to the likely behavior of the other side still more entrenched. To take the example of Brit-
ish trade unions, conflictual strategies were reinforced by the potential for strike action 
to exploit Ford’s vulnerability to disruption of its new cross-border delivery chains.
The most important limit of the path dependence approach is that it contributes little 
to our understanding of why regime competition pressure was stronger in the UK. To 
suggest that regulatory systems in coordinated market economies like Germany always 
impose more constraints on firms than in liberal market economies is not convincing 
in the light of evidence about the IR practices of US MNCs in Europe since the 1990s, 
which suggests that their challenge to IR institutions in Germany has at least recently 
been stronger than in other countries, including Britain (Almond/Ferner 2006).
Therefore, we need to complement convergence and path dependence with the dif-
ferential internationalization approach. To start with, stronger international pressure 
in the UK reflected a “differential” headquarter approach, primarily because of per-
formance hierarchy. Ford UK was considered the “laggard” throughout the 1970s and 
hence caused much more concern at the Ford of Europe HQ than the German subsid-
iary did. This tendency was reinforced by the Ford of Europe HQ location in Essex and 
the fact that Britain was Ford’s largest European market, which meant that IR problems 
in the UK had particularly far-reaching commercial implications. Fordwerke, on the 
other hand, enjoyed “dominance effects,” as it was often praised as the role model the 
British subsidiary should emulate. Change set in only in the late 1970s, when Ford’s 
European performance hierarchy started to shift with the opening of the new Spanish 
plant in Valencia, which contributed to the beginning of management pressure in the 
German subsidiary.
Differentiality was reinforced by the contrasting “appropriation” of HQ pressures by 
subsidiary management. The case study evidence revealed that Ford UK managers, much 
more than their German counterparts, deliberately used investment boycott threats and 
European productivity benchmarking to contain trade union power. This instrumental 
appropriation varied in its forms (different mixes of carrot-and-stick elements) and in 
its objectives (limiting union militancy in the 1970s, exploiting union weakness in the 
early 1980s), but it was a constant feature of management strategy at Ford UK between 
1967 and 1985. And the evidence demonstrated that this was not just a reflection of a 
more adversarial management style but also represented a conscious strategy to change 
domestic IR practices.
Such strategies were further encouraged by the connection between the company level 
and national politics. Management pressure was also stronger in the UK because, more 
so than in Germany, the national IR system experienced a period of intense debate 
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and reform between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. From the Donovan Commis-
sion to Thatcher’s neoliberal agenda, reform debates and reform legislation encouraged 
not only Ford’s experiments with IR innovations at company level but also the firm’s 
involvement in the national reform debates themselves. In comparison, the situation 
in Germany was much more stable, notwithstanding the co-determination controver-
sies of the 1970s. German subsidiary management had therefore few incentives to use 
internationalization to question the postwar IR settlement. If anything, international 
comparison further reduced such ambitions – as chancellor Helmut Schmidt pointedly 
remarked to German employers in 1976: “How fine entrepreneurs feel in the Federal Re-
publican order in spite of all idle talk, appears in the fact that nobody of you, gentlemen, 
would like to shift his factory to Upper Italy or England” (quoted in Hoff 1977: 31).
If we shift the analytical focus from actors to IR processes, the convergence approach 
is clearly the weakest of the three interpretative frameworks. Its only contribution is 
to explain how cross-border integration favored widening the scope of IR processes 
in national subsidiaries. Triggered by trade union pressure, consultation over aspects 
of corporate strategy became increasingly important in the German and British Ford 
subsidiaries alike. Clearly, there remained big differences in institutional terms along 
the path-dependent lines described above.
The convergence approach is of little help with regard to the two other aspects consid-
ered in this article, namely the styles and arenas of interaction: Why did cross-border 
subsidiary integration arouse so much labor–management conflict in the UK, while it 
was dealt with cooperatively in Germany? Why did it remain a company-level affair in 
Germany, while it often reached beyond the boundaries of the firm in Britain?
The path dependence approach offers some important elements in answer to these 
questions. In its “path as legacy” version it correctly links the cooperation-conflict dif-
ference to the contrasting postwar IR institutions in Germany and Britain. Decentral-
ized bargaining and the absence of legal restrictions on strikes reinforced the adversarial 
orientation of the “two sides of industry” in the UK, until Thatcherite reforms radically 
weakened the trade unions and hence reduced the level of conflict in the early 1980s. 
In Germany, by contrast, the dual system of industry bargaining and works council co-
determination acted as institutional inducements to cooperation. With regard to the 
different arenas of negotiation, “legacies” help to understand the absence of “external” 
actors in Germany, as this corresponds to a long-term trend of works council politics in 
the postwar Federal Republic.
The punctuated equilibrium version of path dependence, with its emphasis on “positive 
feedback” as a result of complementarities between IR institutions and other elements 
of national production systems, further adds to the understanding of the conflict–co-
operation dichotomy. Significantly, the roles of British and German production plants 
within Ford of Europe corresponded to those diagnosed by the varieties of capitalism 
approach, in particular with regard to the concentration of larger and higher-value-add-
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ed models in Germany. That this had contrasting implications for labor–management 
interactions is clearly confirmed by the divergent story of engine production, where 
higher capital intensity in UK plants went hand in hand with exceptionally cooperative 
labor relations (Tolliday 2003b: 110–111).
However, this is not the whole story. IR processes in national subsidiaries, in addressing 
the challenge of cross-border integration, underwent a gradual transformation them-
selves, which is not fully captured by path dependence or convergence approaches, or a 
combination of both. With regard to interaction styles, we can observe country-specific 
forms of “layering.” In Germany, the new international environment turned the idea of 
social partnership partly into that of a national partnership, a notion that could build 
on a latent, if not frequently outspoken, emphasis on international market success in 
underpinning class collaboration in the postwar Federal Republic (Esser 1982). In fact, 
this notion can be traced back to the joint labor–management resistance to Allied dis-
mantlement in the late 1940s due to its alleged aim to downgrade German competitive-
ness (Plato 1983). At Ford, the creation of Ford of Europe in 1967 pushed this idea of 
national partnership to the foreground. As we have seen, this did not mean the end to 
labor–management conflict; the mutual “obligation” to act in the “national interest” 
could occasionally become a source of conflict itself. Yet, overall, European reorgani-
zation strengthened the cooperation side of the equation, as can be seen in the use of 
Ford of Europe “threats” as an argument by moderate works council leaders in election 
campaigns.
National partnership had no equivalent at Ford UK. Instead, internationalization not 
only reinforced but also reshaped the conflictual character of labor–management inter-
action post 1960. New fields of conflict emerged, most importantly the conflict about 
whether organized labor should have a say in corporate planning, and the wrangling 
over what and who was to blame for the downgrading of the British subsidiary within 
the European group – the latter quintessentially expressed in the statistical warfare over 
the “correct” form of international performance comparison (investment vs. productiv-
ity benchmarking). These issues remained crucial throughout the period between 1967 
and 1985, yet, in the early 1980s, against the backdrop of the political and legal offensive 
against the trade unions, management could increasingly use them to change the bal-
ance of power in its favor.
A similar layering dynamic can be discerned with regard to arenas of interaction. Here, 
the dynamic was stronger in the UK and mainly meant that IR processes, much more 
than in the past, were partly played out in external arenas, for example in the House of 
Commons or government commissions, or in the national media. In turn, this reflected 
the strong links between developments at company and national levels; indeed, Ford 
at times became a battleground of national politics itself. The blame shifting between 
management and trade unions over Ford UK’s relative decline was embedded in, and 
contributed to, the wider debate about the “British decline” (Tomlinson 2000), most 
obviously during the mid-1970s, when comparative productivity data became a key 
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issue in the numerous inquiries into the crisis of the British motor industry. Likewise, 
Ford’s attempts at IR “innovations” at company level reflected, and at times contributed 
to, the broader national IR reform debate – from “In Place of Strife” in 1969 to the Bull-
ock Report in 1977.
In Germany, by contrast, international layering of IR processes was a company-level af-
fair, most importantly expressed in frequent informal contacts between works council 
leaders and Ford of Europe managers. Company-level interactions were little connected 
to national developments. Occasionally, works council and local management attempt-
ed to use the legal and fiscal resources of the German state, yet these attempts reinforced 
rather than mitigated the “privatization” of IR processes, as discernible, for example, in 
IG Metall’s criticism of works council initiatives to use the federal unemployment fund 
to deal with lay-offs in the wake of strikes in the UK.
If, finally, we turn to the analysis of IR outcomes, we have to explain a pattern that is 
split between the period up to the late 1970s, when the impact of subsidiary integra-
tion remained marginal, and the first half of the 1980s, when this impact became much 
stronger. In the latter period, regime competition pressures considerably influenced 
substantive outcomes even though the key issues were different in the two countries 
(wages and working time flexibility in Germany, work practices in the UK). The same 
holds true for procedural outcomes (strike regulation in the UK, company negotiations 
supplanting industry bargaining in Germany). The key question is, therefore, to what 
extent convergence, path dependence, and differential internationalization approaches 
can account for this split picture.
Convergence ideas can be supported by evidence showing that Ford’s international in-
tegration process accelerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The new Iberian pillar 
accentuated locational competition, and international management coordination had 
more direct IR implications, exemplified by the transfer of US-style concession bargain-
ing to European subsidiaries. In this perspective, the period between 1967 and 1977 was 
merely a “run-up,” which explains the split outcome pattern.
While this argument provides an important explanatory element, it leaves some key 
questions unanswered. One problem is the missing explanation for the significant dif-
ferences in the substantive and procedural outcomes between the two countries in the 
early 1980s. At the same time, “convergence” does not address why subsidiary integra-
tion was only of marginal importance for IR outcomes until the late 1970s, though it 
already had considerable effects on actors and IR processes. Consequently, it is also im-
possible to raise the question of potential links between changes in actor attitudes and 
processes in the 1970s, on the one hand, and changes in outcomes in the early 1980s, 
on the other.
Combining “convergence” with a path dependence approach adds explanatory elements 
without, however, enabling us to account for the whole story. In its “path as legacy” 
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variant, path dependence helps us to understand why changes in substantive and pro-
cedural outcomes in the early 1980s played out differently in the two countries. In its 
punctuated equilibrium variant, path dependence crucially helps to account for the 
change in Britain. Clearly, the onset of Thatcherism constituted a sharp break with pre-
vious IR patterns, which could not fail to influence outcomes in the Ford subsidiary. 
Thatcher’s legal and political offensive against the trade unions in a context of recession 
and mass redundancies provided Ford management with a position of strength, which 
it had never enjoyed during the 1970s and which allowed it to break labor resistance to 
regime competition pressure.
Yet, a punctuated equilibrium model is ill equipped to explain the changes in IR out-
comes in the German case, given that, on balance, the shift to conservative rule in the 
Federal Republic in the early 1980s did not constitute a sharp break with past IR pat-
terns. With regard to the UK moreover, the punctuated equilibrium model makes the 
problematic assumption that the considerable actor pressure for change during the 
1970s was “bound to fail.” While the circumstances were clearly less favorable to radi-
cal reform than in the early 1980s, changes were attempted, and they failed not because 
of actor-constraining institutional legacies but because of the contingent outcome of 
power struggles. To take one example as a counterfactual: Had Heath’s Industrial Rela-
tions Act not failed – and there is enough evidence to suggest that it was not “doomed” 
from the outset (Taylor 1996) – Ford UK management might well have succeeded in 
its aim to remold company-level IR as early as the 1970s. Finally, a punctuated equilib-
rium model of path dependence is no better than a convergence approach in addressing 
potential links between changes in actor attitudes and IR processes in the 1970s, and 
changes in outcomes in the early 1980s.
It is only when we complement convergence and path dependence with the differential 
internationalization approach that we are able to provide a satisfactory explanation for 
the split outcome pattern. In the German case, the impact of subsidiary integration on 
substantive and procedural outcomes was marginal until the late 1970s because, in con-
trast to the UK, there was very little management pressure for change, which, in turn, 
reflected the “dominance” effects enjoyed by the German subsidiary within the Ford of 
Europe group. At the same time, the new international environment entailed a layering 
of actor attitudes (national partnership) and IR processes (co-determination through 
contract), which did not at first translate into concrete outcomes, but which were to 
have important longer-term consequences. In the early 1980s they were crucial factors 
underpinning a new IR settlement at Ford Germany that was negotiated in response to 
growing regime competition pressure, which, apart from being the result of the pan-
European application of concession bargaining, also reflected the changing European 
Ford performance hierarchy. Put simply, the opening of the new Spanish plants meant 
that Fordwerke’s position was no longer as dominant as during the 1970s.
In the British case, cross-border subsidiary integration failed to have a strong impact 
on outcomes until the late 1970s mainly because of a mutual blockade by the key ac-
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tors: The trade unions were successful in resisting concession bargaining, while Ford 
management was able to fend off pressure for union and/or government influence in 
corporate planning matters. International aspects became an important layer of this 
conflictual dynamic and thus contributed to deadlock, expressed not least in the statis-
tical “warfare” over the “correct” interpretation of Ford UK’s diminishing role within 
the European group, which was closely connected to the broader national debate about 
who was to blame for “British decline.” In the early 1980s this changed, most impor-
tantly because of the domestic change emphasized in punctuated equilibrium models 
of path dependence. To a certain extent, however, the longer-term effects of the inter-
national layering of IR processes were also important. Against the backdrop of a shift 
in the “British decline” debate towards the “trade union problem” after the “Winter of 
Discontent” in 1978/79 (Tomlinson 2000), radical programs for “British revival” and 
“catching up with the continent” gained popularity, which was important as much at 
the macro as at the micro level. Nationally, this trend strongly contributed to Thatcher’s 
election victory and underpinned the legitimacy of her radical reform programs in the 
early 1980s. The Ford case illustrates the effects at the micro level, with trade unions be-
ing driven on the defensive to avoid being portrayed as the culprit for the performance 
lag of British plants within Ford of Europe. In the early 1980s this trend was reinforced 
and helped to undermine potential resistance to concession bargaining.
6 Conclusions
As these last remarks indicate, the historical case study of Ford has revealed many 
elements with much wider implications for the recent development of industrial rela-
tions in Britain and Germany. In both countries, gradual changes in the 1970s, partly 
driven by internationalization processes, “foreshadowed” crucial transformations in the 
1980s and 1990s, the impact of which is discernible still today. In Britain, the Ford 
case illustrates at a micro level the dynamics through which internationalization con-
tributed to Thatcher’s IR revolution. In Germany, Ford can even be seen as a forerun-
ner of transitions in the 1990s: the partial shift of cleavages from class to production 
location, the blurring of lines between management and works council prerogatives, 
the superimposition of co-determination through rights by co-determination through 
contract (see Rehder 2003). Indeed, Rehder (ibid.: 68) has identified Fordwerke as one 
of the “trendsetters” in this regard. The internationalization of IR at Ford Germany 
and Britain between 1967 and 1985 is thus a good example for illustrating processes 
of institutional “layering” and “conversion” (Streeck/Thelen 2005) which gradually ac-
cumulate and feed into subsequent transformations of a more far-reaching nature. By 
the early 21st century, ironically, these transformations have led to a situation which 
seems to reverse the dynamic of the 1970s: Recent studies of the IR practices of US 
multi nationals emphasize that their challenges to IR institutions in Germany have been 
stronger than in other European countries, including Britain (Almond/Ferner 2006) – 
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in complete contrast to the situation at Ford in the 1970s. While celebrated as a “best 
practice” model during the 1970s, German IR appear today to be much more critically 
viewed as a “location factor” in international comparison even though, as in the case of 
the UK three decades earlier, much of that criticism is subject of controversial debate.
On a more general level, the case study suggests that processes of cross-border subsid-
iary integration were already an important factor shaping industrial relations in some 
subsidiaries of multinational firms during the 1960s and 1970s, regardless of the inter-
national macroeconomic regime of “embedded liberalism.” One implication of this is 
that more research in the field of IR studies in MNCs should be dedicated to the period 
prior to the 1990s; another one is that there has perhaps been too much emphasis in 
the contemporary literature on the shift from “embedded” to “neoliberal” capitalism in 
Western Europe during the 1980s and 1990s (van Apeldoorn 1998). To be sure, Ford 
belonged to a small group of companies pioneering subsidiary integration before the 
1980s, while a much larger number of firms followed suit only in the wake of the Single 
European Market in the late 1980s (Dicken 2007). Undoubtedly, too, this process has 
accelerated during the last two decades, driven in particular by regime competition with 
its ever more sophisticated forms of performance benchmarking and intra-company 
investment tenders. Still, the Ford case suggests a longer “pre-history,” implying, for 
example, that the recent accentuation of regime competition might be due at least as 
much to the geographical extension of “exit” areas (Southern and later Eastern enlarge-
ment of the EC/EU) as to the neoliberal shift.
Finally, in methodological terms, the article underlines the importance of a recent trend 
among comparative political economists to search for new analytical tools to account 
for institutional change, and the concomitantly growing interest in historical analysis 
(Hall/Thelen 2009). Based on the idea of “differential internationalization” as a sup-
plement to convergence and path dependence approaches, the article has suggested a 
number of ways in which to conceptualize international factors for the analysis of such 
gradual, country-specific forms of change.
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